LIABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: THE BENEFITS, THE COSTS,
AND THE TRANSACTION COSTS
REIMUND SCHWARZE
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As we learn that the danger of climate change is real and imminent, we need to develop social mechanisms to redistribute the uneven economic damages resulting from it, both nationally and internationally. The polluter-pays principle, which is widely applied in
environmental policy, is an immediate way to do this. Liability for
climate change has several advantages: it could generate knowledge
about the size and probability of economic damages, and it would cre1
ate institutions to minimize these costs, such as insurance. However,
the liability model faces severe obstacles, in both national and international law, as many of the other speakers in this Symposium have
2
pointed out. The duty of care and proof of causation are cornerstones of any system of liability. Both pose serious barriers to claims
for compensation in this field. Depending on how these rules are implemented, claims for climate change-related damages could become
crushingly expensive and cause high transaction costs, as the following
example may show.
I calculated the potential liability in a climate damage suit for six
randomly selected coal power plants in Pennsylvania. To establish
their potential liability in 2012, I added their emissions from 1992—
the year when they “knew that their behaviour (or omission to regu3
4
late their economies) would contribute to future damage” —to 2006
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and extended the trend of the last fifteen years to 2012. I then
weighted these emissions with a damage figure of $50 per ton of carbon based on a comparison of twenty-eight studies done by Richard
5
Tol. Tol shows that the range of figures in the literature is huge—
6
from -$6.60 to $1667. He also demonstrates, with a confidence level
7
of 95%, that the distribution of damage will lie below $62 per ton.
Compared to the controversial Stern Report, which puts the social
8
costs of carbon at $314 per ton, the damage in this figure can be seen
as a “conservative” estimate.
Table 1 demonstrates that the liability for climate-related damages
would be “crushing” if total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since
1992 were accounted for in a climate damage suit. In three out of six
randomly selected cases, the damage claim would exceed Exxon’s li9
ability—$2.5 billion—for the Valdez oil spill, one of the greatest single damage awards in history. Further, if we estimate the cost of attorneys’ fees and administration using the data of Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin for the U.S. tort system as a whole, we see that transaction costs
10
would add up to more than $2.4 billion after only six cases! The bot4
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tom line is that liability for climate change would be extremely expensive not only in terms of insurance costs but also in terms of transaction costs. And it will be a singular occasion for unproductive rentseeking activities by law firms. Exactly because the rules for accountability are so uncertain in this context, there is ample room for lobbying and arguing before the court.
Table 1: Potential Liability and Transaction Costs
of Climate Change Liability

Potential Liability

Claimants’
Attorneys’ Fees

Bruce Mansfield
Shippingport, PA

$ 3700 million

$ 1496 million

Homer City
Indiana, PA

$ 3700 million

$ 1499 million

Hatfields Ferry
Greene, PA

$ 2500 million

$ 1021 million

Martins Creek
Northampton, PA

$ 726 million

$ 294 million

Mitchell Power Station
Courtney, PA

$ 426 million

$ 173 million

$ 34 million

$ 14 million

Power Plant

Montour
Montour, PA

The sensitivity of potential liability to the implementation of liability rules is shown in Figure 1.

with large actions that reduces this number below the average figure for the U.S. tort
system.
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Figure 1: Sensitivity of Potential Liability to Accountability Rules:
Total Liability for the Bruce Mansfield Plant
$/tC
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If, for example, we look at the potential liability of the Bruce
Mansfield Power Plant in 2012 and consider its contribution to the
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere (GHG load) rather than its
periodic GHG emissions (as in Table 1), only about 40% of its emissions in the period 1992-2012 would be additive to climate change, as
the preexisting GHG load reduces the forcing of subsequent emis11
sions. Its liability must consequently be restricted to the plant’s contribution to the GHG load, or about $1.5 billion. In considering the
plant’s duty of care, we could plausibly argue: why should the owner
of Bruce Mansfield do more than average people in the developed
world did in the same period to prevent dangerous interference with
the climate? Taking the Kyoto Protocol as a benchmark establishing a
duty of care, the plant would be required to reduce its emissions by
about 5%. Hence, 95% of the plant’s emissions would not be penalized under a tort system. The plant’s expected liability would conse11
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quently shrink to $185 million. We could continue along this line to
bring liability to zero when any duty of care was denied. On the other
hand, despite having raised the point of transaction costs, I did not
give you the full picture. If we add the cost of the defense and tort system administration as a whole to any damage award the claimant
might obtain, we could arrive at total costs for a single case of up to
$8.8 billion. The sum of damage costs and transaction costs per ton of
carbon could thus range from $2 to $120 per ton of carbon, depending on how the duty of care is established, what type of accountability
rule applies, how damages are awarded, and the size and type of
transaction costs involved.
Liability for climate change would heavily affect the U.S. economy. But it would also affect economies outside the United States depending on the way it is determined. If, for instance, Kirsten Engel’s
12
suggestion to use approved allowances from the European Union to
judicially force a tradable permit market on “laggards” within the
United States—be they states or firms—is adopted, we can expect even
less liquidity and higher carbon prices in the European Union. Another example is leakage. If the United States were to establish a
crushingly expensive regime ascribing liability to individual polluters,
there would be a serious incentive to relocate GHG-intensive industries to countries such as China and India, which have no or almost no
restrictions on GHG emissions and no liability for climate-related
damages. The bottom line is that we must consider and calculate the
costs of a climate change liability in a global economic context.
My final point is that I have—painfully—learned that a “grand design” is probably not the best answer to the problem of international
climate change. International negotiations have arrived at a patchwork of different regimes, at different levels, geared to different sets
of technology, which only loosely tie into the goal of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change to “prevent dangerous anthro13
pogenic interference with the climate system.” What strikes me is
how little we have looked into the interactions of policies within this
“patchwork design” of international climate change policy (ICCP).
Erik Bluemel provided an interesting example of the multiple con-

12

Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Ligitation Approaches to Climate
Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1565-67 (2007).
13
Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.

1952

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1947

flicts that will arise in such a regime of ICCP with co-existing seller
14
and buyer liability. We need many more studies of this sort.
Another example of a potential flaw in “patchwork designs” is the
standards used to set the targets of coexisting international cap-andtrade systems. If liability in, say, a nuisance regime in the United
States increases whenever Annex B countries decide to decrease their
tolerated level of GHG emissions, we will see even stiffer political resistance in the United States against any international regime of capping
emissions than we already see without firms being held liable for climate damages at home. This argument extends to industrialized
countries as a whole if international liability for climate change applies. There are many serious political and economic problems of this
sort involved in an “entropic regime” of ICCP; thus there is plenty of
room for future research in the law and economics of climate change
policy.
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